Trademark Dilution: Part I

* This article is for non-lawyers, or attorneysdilution). This article explains the elements and scope
practicing in areas of law other than trademark law,of a federal cause of action for dilution for a mark.
seeking to familiarize themselves with the basics ofInfringement is discussed in [Related Article]. Elements
trademark dilution. This article is Part I of a two partof a Federal Dilution Claim Section 43(c) of the
series. Introduction Trademark law has evolved tofederal Lanham Act lays out the requirements for
give what is, in essence, a quasi-property right in apleading and proving a federal dilution claim. 15 U.S.C.
"word, name, symbol or device" that identifies and§ 1125(c). This section, which comes from
distinguishes one person's goods (or services) fromlegislation called of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
those of another. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. The(FTDA), says states that the holder of a "famous
justification for this is twofold. First, to protect themark" may stop another from using "in commerce"
public from confusion or deception about who is thean identifier that "is likely to cause dilution by blurring
source of a given product or, in the case of aor dilution by tarnishment." That definition sets up a
service mark, a given service. Second, to protect aneat four-part test courts can follow to determine if
business's investment in the goodwill in the mark.a mark has been, or is likely to be, diluted. To prove
Enforcement of such "right" typically takes one ofdilution, then, a mark holder must establish all of the
two forms: "Infringement" or "dilution." Laws barringfollowing: (1) the mark is distinctive and famous; (2)
trademark "infringement" seek to protect the firstthe defendant is using its own mark in commerce (3)
interest. They focus on whether consumers are likelythe defendant's use begin after the plaintiff's (4) the
to be confused by the public use of two similardefendant's use is "likely" to cause dilution by blurring
marks. Conversely, laws governing "dilution" seek toor tarnishment 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). A Distinctive
protect the second interest. In so doing, dilutionand Famous Mark The Lanham Act lays out four
jurisprudence focuses on whether the owner'snon-exclusive areas of proof that can weigh into
investment in a mark has been lessened or diminishedwhether a mark is sufficiently famous to warrant
when someone a third party uses a similar identifier.protection from the diluting use of a similar mark.
Put another way, it protects from a "free riding onThese are: (1) the duration and extent of advertising
the investment" the trademark holder has made. I.P.or publicity of the mark; (2) the amount and breadth
Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 50 (1stof sales of the item; (3) the extent to which it is
Cir. 1998). Trademark Dilution is a Cause of Action inactually recognized by the public and (4) whether the
its Own Right Trademark dilution is not a meremark was registered. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(A).
fallback position for an unsuccessful someone whoThese factors are looked at on a "totality of the
was not able to prove infringement plaintiff. 4circumstances" basis, to help a court decide if the
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competitionmark is "widely recognized by the general consuming
§ 24:70 (4th ed.) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127,public of the United States as a designation of source
and Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscapeof the goods or services of the mark's owner."
Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (C.D. Cal.Times Mirror Magazine, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports
1999)). Rather, it is a distinct wrong and, therefore, aNews, LLC, 212 F.3d 157 (3rd Cir. 2000) The Lanham
distinct cause of action. The First Circuit explained thisAct was amended in October 2006 and these
distinction rather eloquently in I.P. Lund Trading ApS v.factors are revised substantially from the list of eight
Kohler Co.: [I]f a cocoa maker began using the "Rollsincluded in the previous version of the law. Amending
Royce" mark to identify its hot chocolate, no15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c). Pub.L. 109-312, § 2,
consumer confusion would be likely to result. Few120 Stat. 1730 (Oct. 6, 2006). It is unclear as yet
would assume that the car company had expandedwhether the new formulation will change what marks
into the cocoa making business. However, the cocoamight be considered sufficiently "famous" to be
maker would be capitalizing on the investment thediluted. Under the earlier version, most courts
car company had made in its mark. Consumers readilydisposed of the "fame" question summarily. E.g.,
associate the mark with highly priced automobiles ofAmica Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D.Va.
a certain quality. By identifying the cocoa with the1998). So it is possible that the "I know it when I see
Rolls Royce mark, the producer would be capitalizingit" nature of this inquiry might be unaffected. Under
on consumers' association of the mark with highthe earlier formulation of the law, however, and as
quality items. Moreover, by labeling a differentexamples to illustrate how the factors historically
product "Rolls Royce," the cocoa company would bewere applied, the following marks are some examples
reducing the ability of the mark to identify the markof those that have been considered to be sufficiently
holder's product. If someone said, "I'm going to get afamous and distinctive to warrant protection: AOL,
Rolls Royce," others could no longer be sure theBarbie, Budweiser, Ford, Nike, NASDAQ, and
person was planning on buying an expensiveVelveeta. America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d
automobile. The person might just be planning on548, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1857 (E.D. Va. 1998); Mattel Inc. v.
buying a cup of cocoa. Thus, the use of the mark toJcom Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1467 (S.D.N.Y. 1998);
identify the hot chocolate, although not causingAnheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Andy's Sportswear, Inc., 40
consumer confusion, would cause harm by diluting theU.S.P.Q.2d 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Ford Motor Co. v.
mark. I.P. Lund., 163 F.3d at 50. The concept ofLloyd Design Corp., 184 F. Supp. 2d 665, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d
dilution can be further subdivided in two categories:1109 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Nike Inc. v. Variety
"Blurring" and "tarnishment." Blurring is best describedWholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1372 (S.D. Ga.
above in the I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co.2003), aff'd, 107 Fed. Appx. 183 (11th Cir. 2004); Kraft
decision-to wit, it occurs when the "unique andFoods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 63
distinctive link" between the plaintiff's mark and itsU.S.P.Q.2d 1353 (N.D. Ill. 2002). The following marks
goods or services is muddied and so its value iswere deemed not sufficiently famous and distinctive
depressed. Tarnishment, occurs when a famous markto justify protection: Avery Dennison, for office
is associated with an offensive or inferior good, or issupplies; Fun Ship, for a cruise line; Weather Guard,
portrayed in a degrading context, thus lessening thefor vehicle tool boxes for contractors; We'll Take
value of the senior mark. In short, the nature ofGood Care of You, as a slogan for a chain of retail
dilution is to eat away at the value of another'spharmacies. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189
trademark. And, in precluding the otherwiseF.3d 868, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1801, 1806 (9th Cir. 1999);
competitive acts that might dilute a mark, theCarnival Corp. v. SeaEscape Casino Cruises, Inc., 74 F.
anti-dilution statute gives the mark-holder a muchSupp. 2d 1261, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1920 (S.D. Fla. 1999);
broader property right than a mere claim forKnaack Mfg. Co. v. Rally Accessories, Inc., 955 F.
infringement does. E.g., The Toro Co. v. Torohead,Supp. 991, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1649 (N.D. Ill. 1997);
Inc., 2001 WL 1734485 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd.),Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. TGC Stores, Inc., 939
61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1164. (It is a "bedrock principle ofF. Supp. 340 (D.N.J. 1996). Use in Commerce "Use,"
trademark law" that multiple uses of a term as avery simply put, means commercial use. Mattel, Inc. v.
mark can co-exist when used for non-related goods.MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002)
Dilution upsets this balance and enables the owner of(the inquiry is basic, thought the requirement seems
a famous mark to prohibit the use or registration of"ungainly.") In other words, the defendant must have
the same or substantially similar mark even onemployed the famous and distinctive mark - or one
unrelated goods.) Dilution Cases Are Subject to anearly identical to it - to sell goods other than those
High Degree of Scrutiny Dilution is thus deemed to beproduced or authorized by the mark's owner.
an "extraordinary remedy." Advantage Rent-A-CarPanavision Int'l, LP v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324-25
Inc. v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 238 F.3d 378, 381(9th Cir. 1988); Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 903 (dilution
(5th Cir. 2001). As the Fourth Circuit explained: [W]efound where MCA created and sold to consumers in
simply cannot believe that, as a general proposition,the marketplace commercial products - the Barbie Girl
Congress could have intended, without making itssingle and the Aquarium album - that bear Mattel's
intention to do so perfectly clear, to create property"Barbie" mark). A non-commercial use of another's
rights in gross, unlimited in time (via injunction), evenmark, on the other hand, is specifically exempt from
in 'famous' trademarks. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Baileythe Lanham Act. This ensures that references to
Combined Shows v. Utah Division of Travelmarks that would otherwise fall within the penumbra
Development, 170 F.3d 449, 459 (4th Cir. 1999). Seeof First Amendment protections are not
also Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224 n.6 (quotation marksinadvertently, and unconstitutionally, also brought
omitted) ("We agree that the dilution statutes do notwithin the ambit of the statute. Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d
prohibit all use of a distinctive mark that the ownersat 903. As such, the following activities are specifically
prefer not be made .... [W]e agree with the Fourthauthorized by statute: 1. Advertising that invites the
Circuit that the dilution statutes do not create aconsumer to compare goods or services; 2. Speech
'property right in gross"'); I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 47that "parodies, criticizes or comments upon" the
("[T]he standard for fame and distinctivenessfamous mark owner, or the goods or services
required to obtain anti-dilution protection is moreidentified; 3. In news reporting or commentary; 4. In
rigorous than that required to seek infringementany other non-commercial fashion. 15 U.S.C. §
protection"). Thus, a plaintiff in a dilution case is likely1125(c)(3). Part II of this series will issue in two
to face an uphill battle. 4 McCarthy on Trademarksweeks.
and Unfair Competition § 24:89.50 (4th ed.); e.g.,Mr. Taillieu is a partner of Zuber & Taillieu LLP. He
The Toro Co. v. Torohead, Inc., 2001 WL 1734485earned his J.D. with highest honors from George
(Trademark Tr. & App. Bd.), 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1164Washington University School of Law, where he
(stating that unlike in trademark infringement cases,graduated #1 in the day class and was Managing
doubts are not resolved in favor of the party claimingEditor of the Law Review.